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NOTE
PATENT LAW-PATENT VALIDITY:
The Public is the Third Party
It is as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valu-
able invention should be protected in his monopoly ....
INTRODUCTION
A controversial issue in the field of patent law is whether the
judiciary, absent specific congressional legislation, should sanc-
tion the growing and diverse means for attacking the validity of
patents.2 The Supreme Court in recent cases3 has reasoned that
the primary purpose in allowing an inventor the exclusive right
to his discovery for 17 years4 is to foster scientific advancement
for the direct benefit of the public. The public, it has therefore
been argued, has the right to be protected from the abuses of
invalid grants of patent monopolies through the express repeal of
such patents by the judiciary.
Those critical of such a direct role by the Supreme Court,
however, would find no repeal power in the judiciary unless Con-
gress had specifically enacted such power.' Since 1836, Congress
'Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
'An example of this controversy is the statement by Mr. T. L. Bowes, Esq., chairman
of the Patent Law Section of the American Bar Association, before the Corporate Patent
Seminar in Cooperstown, New York, on September 23, 1973:
Too many judges have reached the stage where a patent is considered a
monopoly, and since monopolies are bad, patents are bad and any excuse
available . . . should be used to limit their effectiveness or invalidate them.
As reported in Carl Byoir & Assoc., Inc., Press Release, Oct. 4, 1973, Patent System in
Deep Trouble. See Fogt & Hollabaugh, Glaxo and its Ramifications: The Campaign to
"Wreck and Rebuild" Continues, 8 LEs NOUVELLES 127 (1973); Sutton, Glaxo: The New
Role for the Justice Department, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'\ 478 (1973); BNA PAT., T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J., No. 131, C-1 (June 7, 1973); BNA PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., No. 112, A-1
(Jan. 25, 1973).
'See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653 (1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
'35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
[Ojur Constitution gave no power to the executive, but gave all to Con-
gress; and the power it gave to Congress was the power to create by legisla-
tion a system according to its own judgment. . . . The essence of our patent
system is that what is not authorized by the act is ultra vires.
Brief for Appellee at 339, United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888);
see Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884). Unlike that in England, the patent system
in America "is founded exclusively on statutory provisions." Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7
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has enacted only one condition under which a patent may be
subsequently repealed: the interposition of a successful defense of
invalidity in an infringement proceeding At all other times a
patent is presumed valid when issued.7
The issuance of invalid patents is a major and growing prob-
lem. In 1972, a record 77,908 patents were granted by the Patent
Office." Generally a patent examiner spends only 15 hours analyz-
ing an application;9 he is also given considerable latitude in the
interpretation of what constitutes inventiveness.'I As a result of
the crush of applications, the enormous backlog of applications,
the lack of examiner morale, and the length of turnover time,
invalid patents are frequently issued." Studies indicate that on
the average 64 percent of all patents challenged in court are found
to be invalid.'2
Pet.) 292, 319 (1833); accord, James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 359 (1881). See also Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52,
64 (1973).
135 U.S.C. §§ 281-82 (1970). An infringement proceeding occurs when, for example,
X manufacturer produces and sells a product covered by Y's patent. Y sues X for infringe-
ment of Y's patent rights and X defends by claiming that Y's patent is invalid.
735 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
'King, Patent Office Affairs, 1973 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N BULL. 406, 407.
'Commenting upon the shortcomings of such a limited time for application analysis,
one authority has observed that:
It seems to be amply clear that if the present state of affairs is permitted to
continue unchecked, then one simply cannot look for improvement in the
validity of patents which are issued by the Patent Office.
Weissman, An Editorial Comment on Patent Invalidity, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 282, 283
(1973).
"'Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). The following quotations from two
Supreme Court cases emphasize the inconsistent interpretation of "inventiveness" by the
Patent Office:
A patent . . . simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent
Office. Moreover, the legal conclusion is predicated on factors as to which
reasonable men can differ widely.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
To be honest, this Court is rather amazed to find a patent as flimsy and as
spurious as this one has been granted by the Patent Office. Clearly, the
Patent Office is still not applying the strict constitutional standard required
in all patent cases.
Ken Wire & Metal Prods. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 338 F. Supp. 624, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). However, over the past few years
the Patent Office has been engaged in improving these conditions. In 1972, 103,000 patent
applications were filed. The backlog for that year was 200,000, the lowest in 20 years. The
turnaround time for the average patent is now 24 months, the shortest in 50 years. Gotts-
chalk, The Patent Office Today . . . Alive and Well and Looking Ahead, 1973 AM. PAT.
L. Ass'N BULL. 259, 262.
"This figure was reported from one study of 669 reported cases from the circuit courts
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Typical of the harms to the public caused by such invalid
patents are the elimination of free competition, " the restraint of
trade, 4 the repression of knowledge, 5 and higher prices for con-
sumers. " Similar harms to the public were encountered in 17th
century England when corrupt officers of the King issued invalid
monopoly grants. Such abuses led to the enactment of the Stat-
ute of Monopolies by Parliament. 7 Similarly, Congress in the late
of appeal and the Court of Claims during the period from 1961 to 1970. Horn & Epstein,
The Federal Courts' View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134, 139,
146 (1973). An earlier study (1948-54) based on 429 patent cases found 62.7 percent were
held invalid by the United States Court of Appeals. Ladd, Business Aggression Under the
Patent System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 353, 353-54 n.4 (1959).
"'Kidwell, Patent-Right Interchange and Antitrust Policy: Defining the Interface, 43
U. COLO. L. REV. 373 (1972). Kidwell presents an analysis of the techniques used by
holders of invalid patents to work the patent monopoly to their advantage. Kidwell begins
with an example which illustrates the flavor of patent abuses:
An interesting example of such behavior is set forth in United States v.
Vehicular Parking, Ltd. One of the defendants in that case, prior to the
creation of the patent pool, had written a letter which said in part:
The parking meter business is new and seems to offer ample oppor-
tunity for profit. From my study of the Patent aspects it seems that
very little has been done to create a Patent monopoly.
The letter went on to suggest the pooling of certain specified patents to
accomplish the monopoly. In a later letter he informed the other defendants
that the "Doyle Patent" contained the broadest claims:
These claims are not such, however, as should be put into litigation
because I am afraid they might be invalidated by certain prior art.
At present they are accorded a prima facie validity which could be
used to advantage in discouraging competition.
And in this instance the weak patents plus threats of litigation were used
successfully to establish price maintenance and other anticompetitive prac-
tices within the industry under the umbrella of a patent pool.
Id. at 369 (footnote omitted).
"See, e.g., Keating, The Patent Monopoly Versus Antitrust Activism: Open Warfare
or Armed Truce?, 77 DICK. L. REV. 1. 9 (1972).
For the evidence is strong that our system tends to frustrate invention and
tie up technology so the public can not benefit from it.
119 CONG. REC. S5378 (1973) (remarks of Senator Hart). See also Chope, Conflicts Be-
tween Patents and the Antitrust Laws, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 819, 821 (1967).
"Since the owner of a patent has a monopoly, his prices tend to be higher due to the
lack of competition.
This illegal monopoly exaction from the public can often be of great magni-
tude, as witnessed by the invalid tetracycline antibiotic patent issued as a
result of fraud on the Patent Office. One witness estimated that the $100
million plus damage settlement offered by the tetracycline offenders repre-
sents only 10 cents on the dollar of the damage done to the public. . . . That
$100 million alone-the minimum damage caused the public by just one
invalid patent-is nearly double the annual appropriation of the U.S. Patent
Office.
119 CONG. REC. H2866 (1973) (remarks of Representative Owens).
'7D. FALCONER, W. ALDOUS & D. YOUNG, TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 3 (1971)
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19th century also legislated against many abuses caused by mo-
nopolies," but constitutionally-authorized patent monopolies
have escaped much of the corrective legislation."'
The armor of patent monopolies is being pierced by the judi-
ciary in allowing greater leeway to attack patent validity in anti-
trust proceedings, in infringement actions by patentees, in licen-
see cross-actions in defense of royalty claims, and so forth. "' In so
doing, the courts have relied heavily on a developing body of law
based on concepts of public policy. Such protection of the public
arguments appear to be the result of a judicial revitalization of
the old common law remedies originally adopted in response to
monopoly abuses during the Elizabethan Era.
After examining the common law basis of the patent system
and demonstrating that the evolution of the present patent sys-
tem has involved a departure from and reunification of the patent
system with common law, this note will present authority and
support for the proposition that the government should have the
capability, as a roving advocate for the public, to challenge pat-
ent validity."
I. COMMON LAW HERITAGE
The practical beginnings of the patent system occurred dur-
ing the 16th century reign of Queen Elizabeth I with the issuance
of letters-patent and letters-patent for inventions by the Crown.22
In order to encourage the creation and growth of new industries
the Crown issued legal monopolies authorized by letters-patent.2
[hereinafter cited as TERRELLI.
"For the relationships between antitrust and patent law see W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND
ANTITRUST LAW (1973); G. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942); R. NORDHAUS
& E. JUROW, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW (1961); Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1938); Ladd, Business Aggression Under the Patent
System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 353 (1959).
"'Note, Invalid Patents: Removing Statutor, Protection From Improperly Granted
Monopolies. 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 247, 248 (1970).
""Id. at 247-78.
2'Others who have advocated this approach are 2 W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 725, at 471 (1890) Ihereinafter cited as W. ROBINSON]; Feuer,
The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1176 (1938);
Note, Revocation of a Patent by Government Suit, 48 YALE L.J. 1095 (1939).
2
"TERRELL, supra note 17, at 2.
ILietters patent, that is, open letters, literae patentes: so called because
they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the great seal pendant
at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the king to all his
subjects at large.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 346 (Christain ed. 1822). Practically, the holder of a
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Thus activities such as the importation of tea, the manufacture
of soap, and the sale of playing cards were granted as monopolies
to select individuals. The first adjudication of a letters-patent
was the Case of Monopolies2 wherein the King's Bench held that
a grant by the Crown was invalid if:
1. it prevented a craftsman from carrying on his trade;
2. it raised the price of a commodity; or
3. the Crown was deceived or mistaken in granting the pat-
ent.
Soon thereafter, the first case concerning the legality of a
letters-patent for invention, the Clothworkers of Ipswich Case, '-
held that patents for inventions were a special monopoly not
subject to restrictions of other patents provided that they were
not contrary to law or harmful to trade or to the state. Thus the
letters-patent for inventions became a different type of monopoly
with fewer common law restrictions than the standard letters-
patent monopoly.
At common law, three methods were available for challeng-
ing the validity of letters-patent for inventions, and all were
based on the writ of scire facias:25
(1) When the King by his letters-patent has by different patents
granted the same thing to several persons, the first patentee shall
have a scire facias to repeal the second; (2) When the King has
granted a thing by false suggestion, he may by scire facias repeal his
own grant; (3) When he has granted that which by law he cannot
grant, he jure regis, and for the advancement of justice and right,
may have a scire facias to repeal his own letters-patent.
2 7
In 1623 the issuance of letters-patent by corrupt officials
caused the King to invoke his in terrorem powers and to summa-
rily repeal 20 patents.2 8 Many remaining letters-patent were also
letters-patent acquired a crown-authorized monopoly on a certain industry or enterprise.
The letters-patent was notice to the world of this privilege.
"Darcy v. Allen, 1 Web. Pat. Cases 1, Noy 173, Moore K.B. 671, 11 Co. Rep. 84b
(1602).
2 Godbolt 252; 1 Abb. Pat. Cases 6 (1615).
2 A judicial writ, founded upon some matter of record, such as a judgment
or recognizance and requiring the person against whom it is brought to show
cause why the party bringing it should not have advantage of such record,
or (in the case of a scire facias to repeal letters patent) why the record should
not be annulled and vacated.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (4th ed. 1968).
"7Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 439 (1872), citing 4 Coke's Inst. 88, Dyer
197-98, 276, 279.
'TERRELL 3; see also Note, supra note 21, at 1097-98, where it is observed that:
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attacked in the courts where the King as parens patriae
challenged their validity.29 Also in 1623 Parliament passed the
Statute of Monopolies" which, based on the principles expressed
in the Magna Carta,3' further restricted monopolies. Letters-
patent for inventions, otherwise excepted from these restrictions,
were nevertheless subject to the important proviso that:
they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by
raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient. 2
In summary, letters-patent were monopolies granted by the
Crown to foster industrial development, and the rights and reme-
dies of such monopolies, for the most part, developed at common
law. Special restrictions, however, were statutorily imposed by
Parliament (as witnessed by the Statute of Monopolies) when
abuses became intolerable. On the other hand, letters-patent for
inventions were early recognized as a unique monopoly essential
for industrial progress and were not subject to the same restric-
tions as letters-patent. It is important to note, however, that
letters-patent for inventions were not allowed to restrain trade,
raise prices, nor harm the public. This philosophy concerning
The power of the crown to repeal its grants summarily without judicial
proceedings, hanging in terrorem over the owners of early English patents,
served as a deterrent to flagrant abuse.
"Note, supra note 21, at 1098. See also Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1874):
It may be considered as settled that so much of the royal prerogatives as
belonged to the King in his capacity of parens patriae, or universal trustee,
enters as much into our political state as it does into the principles of the
British constitution.
"'21 Jac. 1, ch. 3 (1623).
The Statute of Monopolies created no new right either in the Crown or the
people; it was simply declaratory of the common law enacted into statute
law . . . and reiterated those principles of the Magna Carta . . . which
declared that the liberties of his subjects shall not be infringed or broken by
royal usurpation ....
I A.W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS 34 (2d ed. 1964).
And we have granted unto them, on the other part, that neither we nor our
heirs shall procure or do anything whereby the liberties in this charter con-
tained shall be infringed or broken; and if anything be procured by any
person contrary to the premises it shall be had of no force nor effect.
Magna Carta, 9 Henry 3, ch. 37 (1225) (emphasis added).
"Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3, 6 (1623). See also United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 330-31 (1948) (dissenting opinion), where it is observed that:
That Section [section 61 has become the foundation of the patent law secur-




harm to the public continued in the United States until the early
1800's.:*
Abuses caused by the English letters-patent monopolies were
strongly detested in America. The American Revolution was pre-
cipitated at least in part by popular resentment of the East India
Company's monopoly on tea." The Madison-Pinckney proposals
for the adoption of the concept of letters-patent for inventions,'
however, were readily received as necessary for the encourage-
ment of industry and for the benefit of the public good. :"
The framers of the Constitution, in tune with the feelings of
the general population, avoided the words "patent" and "monop-
oly" in the final draft, although the words were present in earlier
drafts. 7 Article I, section 8 of the Constitution nevertheless estab-
lished a legal monopoly for patent holders by granting Congress
the power:
[tfo promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by Secur-
ing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
The patent clause thereby empowered Congress to bestow com-
plete, constitutional monopolies on inventors."
Under the power granted by the patent clause, Congress
passed the Letters-Patent Act of 179031 (hereinafter- referred to as
the 1790 Act) which was a codification of the doctrines espoused
in the British common law decisions.' The argument that the
American patent system is solely of statutory fiat is weak, since
the origin of the American patent system as embodied in the 1790
Act was a reformulation of common law tradition.
One deviation of the 1790 Act from common law, however,
was section 5," which provided that any citizen could, upon mo-
"'See text accompanying note 48 infra.
'1G. FOLK, supra note 18, at 117.
: THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (A. Hamilton); see 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 496 (1866).
'Note, supra note 21, at 1097.
: It was doubtless to this knowledge of the common law and statuteable
rights of authors and inventors [referring to the Statute of Monopolies],
that we are to attribute this constitutional provision.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1147 (1933).
:"1 Stat. 109.
"'W. ROBINSON § 725, at 470; see Cullen & Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a
Patent, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 110, 111 (1969).
i That upon oath or affirmation made before the judge of the district court,
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tion, prompt a district court judge to compel a patentee to show
cause why his fraudulently obtained patent should not be re-
voked.' 2 Apparently, this provision was passed in the democratic
fervor of the times. In England such power rested in the Crown
under the writ of scire facias, but the Congress of 1790 placed that
power in the free and independent citizenry. The 1790 Act was
subsequently revised twice, but the essence of section 5 was
maintained.'
Patent adjudications under these acts were argued with con-
stant reference to the then maturing English patent law. Chief
Justice Marshall in 1818 published a treatise,44 as an appendix to
a case, . which summarized both the English common law and
the Letters-Patent Act of 1800 and noted American law's heavy
reliance on English developments. In 1813 Circuit Court Judge
Story concluded that American patent law was the same as Eng-
lish common law." Eleven years later in Ex parte Wood,' Justice
Story, then on the Supreme Court, wrestled with the deviation
of section 5 from common law and held that the wording of sec-
tion 5 was in the nature of scire facias.
Justice Story was concerned in Ex parte Wood about the
where the defendant resides, that any patent which shall be issued in pursu-
ance of this act, was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon, false suggestion,
and motion made to the said court, within one year after issuing said patent,
but not afterwards, it shall and may be lawful to and for the judge of said
district court, if the matter alleged shall appear to him to be sufficient, to
grant a rule that the patentee . . show cause why process should not issue
against him .. .to repeal such patents; and if sufficient cause shall not be
shown to the contrary, . . . the said judge shall order process to be issued
. .. .And in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary ....
judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patents; and
if the party at whose complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given
against him, he shall pay all such costs as the defendant shall be put to in
defending the suit, to be taxed by the court, and recovered in such manner
as costs expended by defendants, shall be recovered in due course of law.
Patent Act of 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 109.
'2In the 1790-1820 time frame it was economically feasible for a citizen to act as a
private attorney general. But see note 50 and accompanying text infra for today's
conditions.
'The first revision was in 1793 where section 5 became section 10. 1 Stat. 318. The
second revision was in 1800 with no change to section 10. 2 Stat. 80.
"See note 81 infra.
'Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 519 (1818).
'129 F. Cas. 1120, 1122 (No. 17,600) (C.C. Mass. 1813).
'p22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 610 (1824):
On the other hand, if the process was to be in the nature of a scire facias, all
the words [of section 51 are sensible and operative, and describe the proper
progress and proceedings upon such a writ.
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protection of the public and the harm caused by invalid patents.
He reasoned that if a citizen did not challenge a patent via an
action based on section 5 (which had a 3-year limitation) that
"still, the public have a perfect security"4 in that anyone could
violate the patent with impunity and, when sued for the viola-
tion, he could then show the patent to be invalid under the com-
mon law infringement defense action. Story confidently stated
that the public was totally protected from patent abuses:
Many patents, under this section, have already, in such suits, been
adjudged void; so that the danger of extensive imposition or injury
is wholly chimerical.49
Perhaps Justice Story's full protection philosophy with its
reliance on infringement proceedings is chimerical when com-
pared to the 1968 cost of 50 thousand dollars'" to litigate a patent:
Because of the potential for having to defend a suit for patent in-
fringement the mere issuance of even an invalid patent is often
sufficient to permit the holder to exclude competitors. . . .Thus
the advantages which flow to the holder of an invalid patent operate
to a very large extent to injure competitors and to restrain
trade. . . . [Tihe holders of invalid patents traditionally have
managed to escape the proscriptive reach of the law.'
Today, infringement proceedings primarily represent the struggle
between large corporations for patent control rather than any
concern for the protection of the public. Industrial power, patent
complexity, and litigation costs have rendered Story's protection
inadequate, although the object of his theorizing-public protec-
tion-certainly remains viable.
In summary, a paramount concern of English common law
and early American patent law was the protection of the public
from the evils of patent monopolies. One such evil was the issu-
ance of invalid patents. Although American patent law is statu-
tory in nature, the early court decisions relied on common law
Id. at 614.
d.
"'Hearings on S. 1042 before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Patent Law Revision, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at
616 (1968) (statement of Henry J. Cappello, President, Space Recovery Research Center,
Inc., and consultant on patent policy for the National Small Business Association). Judge
Frank observed in 1942 that "the expense of defending a patent suit is often staggering to
the small businessman." Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1942).
"'Note, supra note 19, at 248. A thorough discussion of this problem appears in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 334
(1971).
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doctrines. Indeed, Justice Story relied on the Statute of Monopo-
lies (in the absence of specific authority in the 1800 Act) to render
a patent void when challenged in an infringement action:
If the public were already in possession and common use of an inven-
tion fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for pre-
suming that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right
to anyone to monopolize that which was already common. There
would be no quid pro quo, no price for the exclusive right or monop-
oly conferred upon the inventor .... .1
In conclusion, a primary concern in the origin of the Ameri-
can patent system was protection of the public. The next section
discusses the denial of that protection.
II. DENIAL OF COMMON LAW
In Wood v. Williams,": Story's concern for the protection of
the public through the combined coverage of section 5 and in-
fringement litigation was reiterated. The issue in Wood, however,
was whether the United States could be brought in as a party
under section 5 to challenge the validity of any rights claimed or
denied under the patent laws. Wood held that, in view of Story's
reasoning, the matter was purely between citizens. This case sub-
sequently became precedent for denying the right of the govern-
ment to sue in patent validity actions.
In 1836, however, Congress revised the patent laws to encour-
age invention." The Patent Act of 1836 omitted section 5. Unfor-
tunately, the committee reports and the various debates which
might have illuminated the legislative reasons for leaving out this
"Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829).
It has been observed that:
Since Pennock ... was decided in 1829 this court has consistently held that
the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes
for the owners of patents, but is to "promote the progress of science and the
useful arts."
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1917).
1130 F. Cas. 485, 486 (No. 17,968) (D.E.D. Pa. 1834):
On a careful review of the patent laws of the United States, I have found no
indication of an intention, that the United States are to be brought in as a
party to a litigation, respecting the validity of any rights claimed or denied
under those laws.
"The act of 1836 was evidently intended for the benefit of inventors, and was
the offspring of a public sentiment in their favor which increased rather than
diminished during the ensuing forty years. In less than three years afterward
the act of 1839 was passed, every other provision of which was marked by
the same liberal spirit toward inventors, and was manifestly designed for the
furtherance of their interests.
1 W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 357, at 506 n.2 (1890).
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major deviation from common law were never recorded. 5 The
effect of this omission was not determined until 1871, when
Mowry v. Whitney" held the omission to be an implied repeal by
Congress; that is, Congress thereby intended that a private citi-
zen could no longer bring an action to repeal fraudulently ob-
tained patents.
With respect to patent validity challenges in the courts, the
1836 Act has remained unchanged to date. The last statutory
enactment in 1952 incorporated no substantial or controversial
changes and hence was speedily enacted.57 In April 1965, Presi-
dent Johnson established the President's Commission on the Pat-
ent System and instructed it to conduct a comprehensive survey
and to recommend improvements." The President's Commission
subsequently made 35 recommendations59 for reform, and the
Senate finally reported a bill in October 1971 implementing 14 of
the proposed changes. 0 Although President Nixon in his March
1972 technology message called for a "strong and reliable patent
system,"" there has nevertheless been no congressional action on
the 1971 bill or subsequent reform.6"
Under the 1836 Act, the infringement proceeding provided
the only means whereby a patent could be repealed. With the
omission of section 5, therefore, Story's complete protection of the
public logic failed and likewise the restriction of Wood failed.
Nonetheless, the precedent established by Wood that the govern-
ment lacked the power to sue for patent repeal was upheld.63
With this background, District Judge Gasch in 1969 ada-
mantly denied any authority in the government to challenge pat-
ent validity:
[1It would be impetuous for this Court to set about curing the ills
of both the patent system and the antitrust laws in a "wreck and
"Cullen & Vickers, supra note 40, at 112 n.12.
'181 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1872).
"Rich, Comm entary-Proposed Patent Reforms, 1967, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 95, 96
(1967).
-,Exec. Order No. 11,215, 3 C.F.R. 123 (Supp. 1965).
"'REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 5-8 (1966).
"'S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
"Owens, supra note 16, at H2866.
621d.
'United States v. Colgate, 21 F. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); United States v. Gunning,
18 F. 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); Attorney General ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works,
32 F. 608 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876); United States v. Frazer, 22 F. 106 (D.C.N.D. 11. 1884).
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rebuild" fashion by fertilizing a dormant power in the Department
of Justice to challenge patents collaterally for any reason."
Congressional legislation protecting the public from the evils
of invalid patents has been nonexistent since 1836. This absence
of reform, as will be discussed in the next section, has effected a
narrow return to common law by the judiciary, based on the right
of the government to challenge patents obtained by fraud.
III. RETURN TO COMMON LAW
The Supreme Court, in Field v. Seabury,"' anticipated in
dicta that the government had authority, whether or not ex-
pressly granted by Congress, to maintain suits to challenge pat-
ent validity. Fifteen years later Justice Miller, in Mowry v.
Whitney," also in dicta, found authority in the government to
attack an invalid patent under the same conditions for which a
writ of scire facias would have been issued at common law. After
reviewing the requirements for a scire facias, Miller stated:
The scire facias to repeal a patent was brought in chancery where
the patent was of record. And though in this country the writ of scire
facias is not used as a chancery proceeding, the nature of the chan-
cery jurisdiction and its mode of proceeding have established it as
the appropriate tribunal for the annulling of a grant or patent from
the government."7
Justice Miller continued:
If, on the other hand, an individual finds himself injured, either
specially or as part of the general public, it is no hardship to require
him to satisfy the Attorney-General that the case is one in which the
government ought to interfere either directly by instituting the suit,
or indirectly by authorizing the use of its name, by which the
Attorney-General would retain such control of the matter as would
"United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 410 U.S.
52 (1973).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 323 (1856).
In England, a bill in equity lies to set aside letters patent obtained from the
King by fraud . . . .and it would in the United States; but it is a question
exclusively between the sovereignty making the grant and the grantee.
Id. at 332.
"81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1872).
"Id. at 440. Mowry relied on the following rationale:
Nor is fraud in the patentee the only ground upon which a bill will be
sustained. Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake, where
the officer has no authority in law to grant them . . . .In such cases courts
of law will pronounce them void.
United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1864).
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enable him to prevent oppression and abuse in the exercise of the
right to prosecute such a suit."
Mowry was decided, however, upon another issue, and the
sweeping dicta was ignored until United States v. American Bell
Telephone Co.',! (Bell 1), when Justice Miller gave final recogni-
tion to the idea that the government may sue for repeal of a
patent obtained by fraud:
That the government, is authorized both by the Constitution and
the statutes to bring suits at law and in equity . . . is so clear that
it needs no argument .... A
Later, in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.7 (Bell
//), Justice Fuller agreed:
In [Bell T1, it was decided that where a patent for a grant of any
kind issued by the United States has been obtained by fraud, by
mistake or by accident, a suit by the United States against the
patentee is the proper remedy for relief .... 7
Finally, in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.73 (Bell
III), Justice Brewer concurred:
[The government] has a standing in court either in the discharge
of its obligation to protect the public against a monopoly it has
wrongfully created, or simply because it owes a duty to other paten-
tees to secure to them the full enjoyment of the rights which it has
conferred by its patents to them.7
Seabury, Mowry, and the Bell trilogy thereby revived one of
the common law scire facias remedies by recognizing that the
government may challenge the validity of a fraudulently procured
patent. Certainly the other scire facias remedies, with the govern-
ment acting as parens patriae, should likewise be revived to chal-
lenge patents obtained by mistake or accident that caused harm
or injury to the public. The dicta in these cases are broad, with
much concern for the protection of the public, and therefore
should not be construed as permitting only one narrow remedy.
Other areas of law have recognized common law remedies,
especially for the protection of the public. In matters of statutory
construction, for example, the Supreme Court has stated:
"81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 441 (1872).
"128 U.S. 315 (1888).
7"Id. at 370.
7'159 U.S. 548 (1895).
721d. at 555.
,'167 U.S. 224 (1897).
"Id. at 265-66.
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[W]here a statute creates a right and provides a particular remedy
for its enforcement, the remedy is generally exclusive of all common-
law remedies.
. . . [These] are not rules for the conduct of the State. It is a
familiar principle that the King is not bound by any act of Parlia-
ment unless he be named therein by special and particular
words. . . . It may be considered as settled that so much of the
royal prerogatives as belonged to the King in his capacity of parens
patriae, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political
state. .... . 1
The Supreme Court has also held that when statutory crimes are
silent as to elements, remedies, and defenses, the courts can re-
sort to common law holdings. 6 In the area of government grants,
Chief Justice Marshall held that the only authority to challenge
a grant issued by the government resides in the government act-
ing through the courts to ascertain the validity of the grant.77
In the area of land patents, 7 United States v. Beebe71 recog-
nized a duty of the government to institute judicial proceedings
to vacate invalid patents, and United States v. San Jacinto Tin
Co.81 placed this power in the United States based on a direct
derivation from English common law (citing Mowry).
Yet in spite of these Supreme Court decisions recognizing the
government's common law remedies for the protection of the pub-
lic, the right of the government to challenge patent validity, ex-
cept for fraud on the Patent Office, has not been recognized by
the courts. Such reasoning, while admitting a common law heri-
tage,8 ignores the rights of the public to be protected from the
abuses of invalid patents.
IV. MODERN PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
During the late 19th century, abuses from industrial monop-
olies became intolerable and Congress enacted corrective legisla-
"Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 238-39 (1873).
7'Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
7"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 698 (1819).
71Cases on land patents and patents for inventions often considered their common
basis in the government grant. See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224,
239 (1897); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364 (1888); Mahn v.
Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884).
7.127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888).
"1125 U.S. 273, 281 (1888).
1 The Patent Acts of the United States are in a great degree, founded on
principles and usages which have grown out of the English Statute on the
same subject.
Marshall, On the Patent Laws, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 519 (1818).
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tion in the form of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Primarily
founded on the theory that a patent is a constitutionally pro-
tected monopoly, intricate relationships developed between pat-
ent and antitrust law. 3 For purposes of this note, it is important
to recognize that the Justice Department has the authority to
challenge those who restrain trade, monopolize the marketplace,
and repress free competition. 4 These practices are similar to
those which the King, as parens patriae, sought to eliminate at
common law. 5 The holder of a patent monopoly, however, has
generally escaped the corrective reach of antitrust law and, ironi-
cally, under the evolution of the patent system such abuses,
harms, and injuries are protected even when the government in-
validly grants them."8
The courts have recently wrestled with this incongruity of
logic as is witnessed in the following public policy decisions on
patent validity. The trend of the rulings is to increase the means
for attacking patent validity. Kendall v. Winsor, 7 in 1858, fore-
shadowed the modern public policy philosophy:
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly
granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or
advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was
another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing
that monopoly.... The rights and interests, whether of the public
or of individuals, can never be made to yield to schemes of selfish-
ness or cupidity .... "
Justice Fuller in Bell H also demonstrated a precognition for the
current public policy philosophy:
In instituting this suit, the government appeared on behalf of the
public, and, as it were, in the exercise of the beneficent function of
superintending authority over the public interests, and the rule of
construction in such cases is properly regarded as affected by consid-
erations of public policy."
In the past 40 years, many cases have made public policy
arguments a part of viable patent law. In Sola Electric Co. v.
215 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
"A. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS ANTITRUST LAWS §§ 141-61 (1972);
Keating, supra note 14.
"15 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
"See text accompanying notes 29 and 32 supra.
"See text accompanying note 51 supra.
762 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858).
"Id. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
"United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548, 554 (1895).
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Jefferson Electric Co.,90 where the licensee in an antitrust action
attacked the validity of the patent under which he was licensed,
the Court held the attack valid based on the interest of the public
in free competition, even though the licensee had agreed not to
sue. In another antitrust action, United States v. United States
Gypsum Co.," the government was held to have the power to
attack the validity of patents when the patents were used as a
defense (i.e., patent monopolies are constitutionally-authorized
monopolies) to charges of antitrust violations.
The breakthroughs of Sola and Gypsum were solidified in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co."2 Sears involved an infringe-
ment action, brought by the holder of an invalid design patent,
against Sears, Roebuck & Company for its marketing of an
identical product at a retail price equal to the patentee's whole-
sale price. In finding the patent invalid, the court noted:
[Siharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent ....
is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise
of which a consuming public is deeply interested."
Later, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins94 posed the problem of whether,
in a suit by the patentee for nonpayment of royalties, the licensee
was estopped from challenging the validity of a patent under
which he was licensed. The Court held in favor of the patent
validity challenge, observing:
[Slurely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when
they are balanced against the important public interest in permit-
ting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality
a part of the public domain. "
Similarly, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation,9" the Court held that in certain cases when a
patent has been found invalid in a prior judgment, the patentee
is estopped from pleading validity in a subsequent action.
These Supreme Court decisions have generated considerable
comment by those concerned with the impact of such radical
public policy decisions on the hitherto preeminent doctrine that
'1317 U.S. 173 (1942); accord, MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
402 (1947); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
"1333 U.S. 364 (1948).
"2376 U.S. 225 (1964).
"Id. at 231, citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
"1395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"Id. at 670.
"402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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once issued, a patent is valid and untouchable."7 Although these
rulings are aligned with common law dictates, they represent
case-by-case adjudications in separate branches of the patent law
field: infringement actions (Sears); antitrust suits (Gypsum); and
licensee defenses (Sola and Lear). A return to the common law
interest in protecting the public, however, is the apparent trend
in recent cases.
Recently a controversial decision of the Supreme Court fur-
ther emphasized this return. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd."
has been accused of "sending shock waves through the fields of
patent and antitrust law."" Glaxo held that the government in
an antitrust action has the power to attack patent validity as a
collateral issue whether or not the patentee raises the patent as
a defense. The patent must, however, be shown to have a nexus"'°
with the antitrust action. The Court, after reviewing Bell I, Pope,
Gypsum, Sola, Lear, and Blonder-Tongue, held:
We think that the principle of these cases is sufficient authority for
permitting the Government to raise and litigate the validity of the
. ..patents in this antitrust case.101
The dissent, however, concluded that:
the sort of roving commission that the majority now authorizes
whereby the Government may request a court to invalidate any
patent owned by an antitrust defendant that in any way related to
the factual background of the claimed antitrust violation cannot be
regarded as a reasonably necessary extension of any of these princi-
ples.'
0 2
The protection of the public from invalid patent monopolies
and abuses by direct government challenges existed and was en-
couraged at common law. Unfortunately, the majority in Glaxo
denied full application of the common law heritage by their chary
holding:
[Wie do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to
attack a patent by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion
that the patent is invalid . . . . [nior do we invest the Attorney
:7See note 2 supra.
"410 U.S. 52 (1973).
"BNA PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., No. 112, A-1 (Jan. 25, 1973).
"""In this context, where the court would necessarily be dealing with the future
enforceability of the patents .... " 410 U.S. at 59. A good discussion of the Glaxo nexus
is found in Comment, The Governmental Challenge to Patent Validity After United
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 50 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 145 (1973).
"1410 U.S. at 58.
'"'ld. at 69.
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General with a roving commission to question the validity of any
patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case.
13
Thus, instead of solidifying a return to a common law basis,
the Court in Glaxo merely added another exception as to when a
patent can be challenged for validity. History, logic, and a social
concept of the public good dictate that the government has not
only the power, but the duty to challenge invalid patents to the
same extent that the owner of a truly valid patent has the com-
mon law and constitutional rights to a monopoly.
If the remedies of common law were to be revived by the
Supreme Court to correct the abuses of invalid patents, would
they be utilized by the government? The Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department believes that they would:
We also believe that attacks on invalid patents will have a beneficial
effect on the quality of patents generally . . . . and thereby provide
additional protection to the public against the burden of invalid
patents. Therefore, where we believe the invalidity of a patent to be
clear, we will not hesitate to attack it. And, of course, where we
believe a patent has been procured by fraud, we will bring suit to
cancel the patent grant.'0
The practicality of the Justice Department challenging pat-
ent validity not only in antitrust violations but also in a self-
starting role on behalf of the public will be open to debate. Cer-
tainly some members of the judiciary '05 feel that the current Pat-
ent Office structure, with its 64 percent invalidity rate, is harmful
to the public and injurious to commerce. Yet reform of the Patent
Office by Congress appears to be only a remote possibility.'' The
answer lies in vesting in the Justice Department the common law
right to challenge the government's own grant of a patent monop-
oly.
" Id. at 59.
"'McLaren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, 13 IDEA 61, 66 (1969).
(Richard McLaren was Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division when he
delivered this speech to the Thirteenth Annual Public Conference of the PTC Research
Institute held June 5, 1969, at George Washington University. Mr. McLaren is now a
United States District Judge.)
"The patent involved in the present case belongs to this list of incredi-
ble patents which the Patent Office has spawned. The fact that a patent as
flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this Court
to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system
frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are supposed to
govern.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 158 (1950) (Mr.
Justice Douglas, concurring).




A patent is a constitutional grant of a monopoly for a limited
time after which the invention is freely available for public use
and competition; it is not a creature of the Congress or of the
Patent Office. Invalid patents, when obtained by fraud, mistake,
or accident of the Patent Office, work injury and harm on the
public through the restraint of free trade and competition and the
creation of higher prices for consumer goods.
The patent is constitutionally bargained for. The public
reaps the benefits of new ideas and inventions, but endures the
detriment of the anticompetitive harm of a monopoly. The inven-
tor receives the award of a market monopoly for his creativeness,
but he suffers the detriment of making full public disclosure of
his secrets.
When a monopoly is granted for an invalid patent, the con-
sideration of the bargain fails and the public becomes the injured
party. The government, as grantor of the patent, has an obliga-
tion to challenge invalid patents on behalf of the public. Such
public rights have been ignored until recently when patent mo-
nopoly abuses, resembling those which led in part to the libera-
tion of the United States from England, became intolerable to the
Supreme Court. While the trend of these decisions is to increase
patent validity attacks based on public policy reasons, the weap-
ons are few and narrowly construed.
A uniform approach, recognizing the government's role as a
roving public advocate to challenge invalid patents, is clearly
grounded in common law and is the logical extension of the pres-
ent public policy decisions. A return to common law is necessary
since, in the government's grant to the inventor, the public is
clearly the third party.
Robert C. Dorr

